From a Search for Rangatiratanga to a Struggle for Survival - Criminal Justice, the State and Māori, 1985 to 2015.  The 2015 JD Stout Lecture by Workman, Kim
 89 
Journal of New Zealand Studies NS22 (2016), 89-104 
 
From a Search for Rangatiratanga to a Struggle for Survival –  
Criminal Justice, the State and Māori, 1985 to 2015 
 
The 2015 JD Stout Lecture 
 
Presented by Kim Workman 
2015 JD Stout Fellow 
Victoria University of Wellington  




In this presentation, I consider not only the relationship between Māori and the state, but the 
response of key criminal justice agencies to the surge of Māori confidence in the 1970’s and 
80’s, and desire to take control of their own destiny – the Māori renaissance as it became 
known.  How did the Police, the prisons and the youth justice system respond to this call for 
rangatiratanga?  How easily did it respond to the idea that Māori, far from being passive 
recipients of the criminal justice system, wanted a piece of the action? How well did the 
operational reality meld with, on the one hand, the state’s vision of a bicultural nation, and on 
the other, the Māori vision for a measure of autonomy, a rangatiratanga not realised in any 
earlier constitutional or political arrangements? 
 
Defining Rangatiratanga 
According to Hill, many meanings have been given to rangatiratanga, which until fairly 
recently was translated as “chieftainship.” In his view, the term “autonomy” provides the most 
useful overarching interpretation, and one which accommodates conceptual differences over 
time.1 The Taranaki Report of the Waitangi Tribunal saw Māori autonomy as “the rights of 
indigenes … to manage their own policy, resources and affairs, within the minimum parameters 
necessary for the proper operation of the State.”2   
 
The Emerging Māori Renaissance 
It is necessary to track back to the 1970’s, which was a time of considerable political upheaval. 
In the latter part of that decade, the anti-war movement merged with other major causes; 
women’s rights, the anti-apartheid movement, and the emerging Māori renaissance. Māori 
sought increased control over their own affairs; between 1975 and 1980 there were high profile 
protests against the alienation of Māori land, and powerful resistance against earlier policies of 
assimilation and integration. Māori made clear its autonomist view of Māori partnership with 
the Crown, and called for the government to reflect the bicultural direction of New Zealand 
society. While the public sector came to grips with the emerging policy of biculturalism, the 
Māori cry for tino rangatiratanga became increasingly persistent, transforming not only 
conversations within the public sector, but across the nation.  
 
Kara Puketapu was appointed as Secretary of the Department of Māori Affairs in 1977, and 
introduced the “Tu Tangata” or “Stand Tall” philosophy, which centred on community-based 
development and promoted cultural and economic advancement through self-reliance and self-
determination. Its “bottom-up” model of community development influenced the public sector 
for the good part of a decade. By 1980, Māori and Treaty matters that previously seemed 
esoteric for mainstream New Zealand were increasingly common topics of national debate.3  
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By 1985, the nation had witnessed the emergence of a large number of Māori-led initiatives in 
health development, the formation of Kohanga Reo, the establishment of the Māori Language 
Commission, and the creation of Urban Māori Authorities. Māori-led community-based 
initiatives actively addressed the structural issues which contributed to crime, with active 
government support in such areas as job training, health and well-being, initiatives and social 
housing. The Mātua Whangai programme, started in 1983, provided for whānau and hapu 
based (rather than state-welfare) intervention, to provide alternative care for “youth at risk,” 
and to de-institutionalise young Māori in Social Welfare homes. Māori were being listened to, 
and were increasingly seeking a greater role in addressing issues of offending by Māori. 
 
Māori Over-Representation in the Criminal Justice System 
At the same time that Māori were seeking a greater role in state business, including criminal 
justice, the incidence of reported offending by Māori was growing, a trend which increased 
exponentially during the post-World War Two urban Māori migration, but for which there was 
evidence well before that. In the nineteenth century, the ratio of Māori prisoners had fluctuated 
at between 1.5 and 3 percent of all receptions, rising to 4.6 percent in 1918.  This figure 
remained stable until the post-depression economic recovery, growing to 11 percent in 1936.  
Between 1936 and 1944 that percentage increased to 26.4%.  Between 1950 and 1970, the 
number of Māori prisoners received into prisons, relative to all prisoners, doubled.4  
 
By 1947, “offences against good order,” comprised 38.5 percent of all offences by Māori, with 
drunkenness being the most common offence.5 Assaults remained under 5% of all offences, 
and there was a significant increase in traffic offences. At that time, the police force was 
ethnically pākehā with one glaring exception; Inspector Bill Carran, an officer of Māori descent 
who joined the police in 1920 and retired in 1960 with the rank of Assistant Commissioner.6  
 
Māori commentators suspected that the pākehā police were harder on Māori than on Pakeha.7 
Toward the end of World War Two, perceived inequality of treatment grew, and led to a 
Commission of Inquiry in 1955.8 Subsequently, the 1961 Hunn Report confirmed that Māori 
were more likely than non- Māori to be imprisoned, sent to Borstal or placed on probation, less 
likely to have court cases dismissed than non-Māori, and more likely to be committed to the 
Supreme Court for trial.9 Māori came to Court with no idea how to plead or defend themselves, 
and about 80 percent of Māori were not represented by counsel, compared to 60 per cent of 
Europeans. In addition, about 80 to 85% of Māori pleaded guilty compared to 60 percent of 
Europeans.10 
 
The Hunn report failed to develop its insights further and failed to consider the possibility of 
institutional and personal racism, or the lack of legal representation.  Jack Hunn did raise the 
issue with the police and judiciary, but was stonewalled.11  These differences persisted, and 
were later confirmed in a 1973 study by O’Malley.12 
 
The Police and Māori  
By 1974, as the crime rate and violence increased, Māori became the focus of Police attention. 
The Auckland Police Task Force, formed to reduce crime, quickly drew allegations that it was 
racist and selectively picked on young Māori and Polynesians. Complaints about its conduct 
were made by the Auckland Committee on Racism and Discrimination (ACORD), the 
Auckland District Māori Council, the Citizens Association for Racial Equality (CARE), and 
the Auckland Council for Civil Liberties. Commissioner Burnside intervened, and met with 
complainant groups to hear their complaints. Police policies toward Māori and Pacific peoples 
improved in 1975.13 
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The Police were under pressure, and it started to show. Cameron’s study of successive annual 
Police reports to Parliament during this period suggests growing hysteria.14 A “war on crime” 
theme emerges, and with a staggering disregard for history, describes the increase in violence 
as “characteristically foreign” to New Zealanders. In 1974, the need to arm the police is hinted 
at, crime has become organised, and bikies are somehow connected to terrorism. By 1978, the 
law has become an “ass” and “penal kindness” has been substituted for the deterrent aspects of 
punishment.  
 
By 1978, there was a significant increase in ethnic gangs, and evidence that the problem was 
spiralling. Warren Young and Jane Kelsey’s 1982 research on that period shows that the 
community went through a period of moral panic, encouraged by media reporting and political 
rhetoric, which led to an increased emphasis on hard-line policing, repressive legislation, and 
severe sentences. The Police alleged that gangs represented a threat to the very roots of society, 
and were being exploited for political ends by Māori political activists.15 
 
Māori Activism 
The coupling of Māori gangs with increased Māori political activism gives some indication of 
the additional pressure on the Police, at a time when the Māori cry for rangatiratanga took on 
a more active expression.16   
 
The police found themselves facing confrontational expressions of rangatiratanga at Waitangi 
Day, and a succession of protests, beginning with the 1975 Hikoi, the Raglan Golf Course 
protest in 1978, and the infamous evictions at Bastion Point in 1978.  
 
Public support for the police was becoming increasingly problematic. Apart from the 
continuing Police–Māori conflict, Police behaviour during the 1981 Springbok tour divided the 
community.   
 
Māori and Prisons 
By 1980, Māori comprised 50% of the prison population. Prisons were at that time managed 
by the Penal Division of the Department of Justice, under the provisions of the Penal 
Institutions Act 1954, with a hierarchical structure that would put the Prussian Army to shame, 
and a high number of Prison Superintendents with a background in the British Prison Service 
or Armed Services. The underlying prison culture was not welcoming to Māori. The 
Department of Justice’s cultural development programme, started in 1986, had bypassed the 
prison service, and until the early 1990s Māori prison officers were forbidden to speak Māori 
to one another or to prisoners, while prisoners were forbidden to speak or correspond in te reo 
Māori. Most Superintendents had no networks with local tribal or Māori organisations, and 
saw no need for it.17 Those relationships were left for the senior managers of the Department 
of Justice to develop.   
 
Māori community members provided tikanga Māori programmes within the prison, but there 
was never any never any suggestion that Māori might have a significant input into policy 
development or operational processes. A proposal by Dr Pita Sharples for a Kaupapa Māori 
prison at the old Napier Prison was unsuccessful, and when the Assistant Secretary, after 
consultation with Ngāpuhi, submitted a proposal for a partnership arrangement for a prison 
planned (but subsequently abandoned) in Te Tai Tokerau, the file was “lost.”  After years of 
negotiation, the new Department of Corrections agreed to establish a Māori Focus Unit at 
Hawkes Bay Prison in 1997 –but one very much owned and operated by the department.  
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The Criminal Justice System and the Question of Autonomy 
There is a current assumption that government agencies are subject to the whims of their 
Ministers, and the political ideology of the day. However, when it comes to the issue of 
departmental autonomy, it would be dangerous to assume that government agencies do not 
have a rangatiratanga of their own: an underlying view about their own special place in the 
universe, their own a set of underlying values and beliefs, accompanied by the underlying 
determination to preserve their autonomy.  
 
The assumption that when shifts in public and penal policy occur, operational departments will 
just roll over and do it, beggars belief. When organisational change requires a government 
agency to share its power and autonomy with another government agency, or even worse, with 
community organisations, there will always be resistance. If Chief Executives have an 
individual vision for change, or better still, the instincts of a social policy entrepreneur, they 
will strategically prepare their staff for change, and personally invest in changing the prevailing 
belief system. Otherwise, it is unlikely the change will either occur, or if it does, that it will be 
successful.   
 
It is useful to consider, then, the nature and reasons for departmental resistance to the push for 
rangatiratanga.   
 
The Police Culture  
The prevailing police culture from 1920 to the 1970s was very much modelled on Sir Robert 
Peel’s vision of the “New Police,” and the need for the police to stand above community and 
factional influence and act out their part as impartial servants of an impartial law. Public 
acceptance of police authority was critical and depended on two basic attributes: their legal 
relationship and the aloofness it gave them from the political process, and the restraint and 
decency of their actions.18 From the late 1960s, and in the face of growing political, economic, 
social and ethnic conflict, the police redefined its role, seeking refuge in a call for “law and 
order.”19  
 
The police role then become that of maintaining the governability of the state, and policing 
became more abrasive and more ubiquitous.20 By the early 1970s, the police pinned its 
relationship with the public and their law enforcement strategy on rapid and efficient response 
to public calls for help; i.e., more efficient “reactive” policing.21 The development of services 
such as Youth Aid and Crime Prevention were intended to offset the hardening police image, 
and were more about increasing police/community contact than involving the community in 
the business of crime prevention. While the early 1980s promised a more active community 
role in crime prevention, no real changes occurred in the overall style of local policing or the 
centralised command structure that supported it.22 
 
By 1985, police efforts to maintain and reinforce their autonomy and to manage and contain 
dissent resulted in the development of a police service in which the war on crime became the 
central focus of policing, and the police institution envisaged itself as being at the centre of 
civil society.23 
 
What the Police did understand was that by broadening formal local input into and support for 
policing, it had a better chance of preserving its political autonomy; a pressing issue, given the 
political compromises that were made by the Police during the 1976 Dawn Raids on 
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Overstayers, and the 1981 Springbok Tour.  Broadening of community contact, would of 
necessity involve and include Māori and other minority groups.24 
 
Values and Philosophy - Corrections  
One of the defining differences between the Police and Corrections at that time was that the 
operational head of the Police had a one to one relationship with the Minister, and a 
constitutional arrangement that provided him with a level of autonomy which other permanent 
heads could only envy. The prisons, by way of contrast, were a division of the Department of 
Justice, and the head of prison operations had no input into penal policy. Indeed, during this 
early period major excursions into penal policy became increasingly the preserve of Ministerial 
Committees.  
 
From 1977 there was growing concern about the operation of the prison system, and in 1981, 
the Minister of Justice established a committee of high-powered criminal justice professionals 
to examine and make recommendations about corrections in New Zealand.25 Known as the 
Penal Policy Review Committee, it took public submissions, visited prisons, and tabled a 232 
page report.  
 
Its central finding was that prisons cannot rehabilitate and should not be expected to do so. It 
recommended restricting imprisonment as much as possible, and expanding alternatives. Most 
of the recommendations were ignored, and resisted by criminal justice officials, although some 
provisions were later included in the 1985 Criminal Justice Act. By the time Labour took office 
in 1984, Geoffrey Palmer inherited a service that was in trouble. Between 1982 and 1984 prison 
populations had risen by 15 percent, prisoner violence was increasing, and in 1985, eight 
prisoners committed suicide. 
 
Palmer’s primary response was to replace the Criminal Justice Act 1954 with the Criminal 
Justice Act 1985, which mandated prison for serious violent offenders, made it clear that 
property offenders should not be sent to prison, and expanded community-based sentences and 
the availability of parole. The recidivism cycle shortened for a time, but prison numbers 
rocketed after 1985. By November 1987, the prison population was over 3000, and by 1991 it 
had risen to over 4,200.26 
 
While Palmer’s expansion of community-based sentences included the potential for Māori 
cultural and marae-based programmes, they were few and far between. Whereas the Police had 
been wrestling since the 1980s with developing a responsive relationship with Māori at a tribal 
level, and senior management of the Department of Justice were equally concerned to interact 
with the Māori community, the Penal Division’s commitment was confined primarily to 
supporting Māori individuals who delivered tikanga Māori programmes within the prison.  
 
Corrections had always resisted the notion that external providers had the capability to deliver 
effective rehabilitative services, without constant monitoring and a burdensome compliance 
regime. The belief was that “No one does Corrections, as well as Corrections.” The contracting 
regime within Corrections made it difficult for community providers to work in an environment 
of trust and partnership. 
 
Unlike the Police, prisons were not concerned with courting public support; but rather 
reflecting the perceived public attitudes of the day.27 Prison culture is notoriously resistant to 
change, as Professor Andrew Coyle, a former Governor of Brixton Prison, explains.  
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… in the eyes of the public and of governments, prison staff lag well behind the police 
in terms of status and public recognition. Sometimes prison staff even sense that the 
public link all of those behind the walls of the prison, whether prisoners or staff, as 
having pariah status. They become frustrated and angry that this should be the case. 
There are two ways of expressing this frustration. The first is by treating the prisoners 
in a way which emphasises that they, the staff, have a moral superiority over them. 
The second is by making the lives of management difficult, usually through indirect 
obstruction of their initiatives.28 
 
Puao te Ata Tu – Addressing Concerns within the Department of Social Welfare 
The one exception was the Department of Social Welfare. In 1984 a series of hui had been 
convened by the Department of Social Welfare to discuss the concerns felt by many Māori that 
the department was a racist and hierarchical institution which reflected the dominant Pākehā 
values of the day and failed to provide fair access for Māori to its services and to income 
support. A group of Auckland staff known as the Women’s Anti-Racist Action Group, and 
others emboldened by Puketapu’s Tu Tangata strategy, joined in the fray. Māori were being 
listened to, and were confident enough not only to pursue changes within government, but to 
lodge grievances against it.  
 
It was through this collective concern about the deplorable government provision of care for 
children and young people that Puao te Ata Tu was born.29 If there was a project in which it 
could be argued that rangatiratanga found (for a time) its fullest expression, Puao te Ata Tu 
was it. The Minster of Social Welfare, Hon. Anne Hercus, formed an advisory group under the 
leadership of Tuhoe elder John Rangihau, to engage in direct and extended consultation with 
Māori communities, social work staff, government agencies, the wider public, and other 
stakeholders. The Inquiry was strongly supported by the then Director General of Social 
Welfare, John Grant. Over 60 hui were held within a nine month period. 
 
The Puao te Ata Tu Ministerial Report sought a commitment from Social Welfare to a 
programme of reform founded on partnership principles as validated by the Treaty of Waitangi. 
It argued for significant procedural and legislative change and greater recognition of Māori 
customary support networks as a conduit for State assistance to Māori communities.  
 
The Appendix to the Report presented a compelling representation of Māori as colonised, 
before a Pākehā ethos of conquest and subjugation. It argued persuasively that there would be 
a major crisis if Māori socio-economic deprivation was not addressed, and recommended that 
Māori communities needed to be integrally involved in addressing Māori issues and problems. 
It urged the government to incorporate the “values, culture and beliefs of the Māori people in 
all policies developed for the future of New Zealand.”30 
 
The case for structural reform, and for the shifting of resources to Māori communities, was 
well argued and the report made a significant contribution to the Children, Young Persons and 
Their Families Act 1989, with greater recognition of customary Māori support structures. The 
Act mandated a radical reform of the youth justice system, and in so doing, attracted 
international attention.   
 
The Public Sector  
In the early 1980’s as Māori grievances and problems came forcefully to the government’s 
notice, public servants were unprepared, and didn’t know how to respond; they were struggling 
to move from a monocultural to a bicultural mode of thinking. In the latter part of the decade, 
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as the focus shifted toward devolution of social services to iwi, and a restructuring of the 
economy based on the principles of neoliberalism, political attitudes toward offenders 
hardened. The call from Māori to occupy a pivotal place in the criminal justice system, other 
than as offenders and victims, met with increased pushback and resistance.   
 
Cabinet Direction 
In 1986 a Cabinet Minute called for a re-examination of the policies and practises of 
Government Departments and directed that all future legislation referred to Cabinet at the 
policy approval stage should draw attention to any implications for recognition of the principles 
of the Treaty of Waitangi. It also required government departments to consult with appropriate 
Māori people on all significant matters affecting the application of the Treaty.31 
 
Te Urupare Rangapu 
The publication of Te Urupare Rangapu in 1988 with its focus on an enhanced Department 
responsiveness to Māori needs and tradition left no doubt that major changes would be 
necessary in the Public Service.32 In Te Urupare Rangapu, the Government made plain both 
an intention and an obligation regarding the handling of matters Māori by public sector 
agencies. It required of its agencies a more positive and effective response to Māori issues, 
aspirations and concerns, and with this in mind gave notice that its chief executives would be 
held accountable for the implementation of such measures.  
 
Over the years, government funded agencies had largely been unresponsive to the needs of 
Māori people and this manifested in the low levels of achievement and consumer satisfaction 
that Māori experienced. Te Urupare Rangapu, in the absence of any Cabinet instruction to the 
contrary, became the Government's implicit Māori policy framework, and was later built upon 
by the focus contained in Ka Awatea.33 
 
That government commitment waivered over the next decade, but from time to time successive 
governments re-asserted a commitment to biculturalism. The strongest references to Article 
Two rights were articulated in He Pūtahitanga Hou, the Labour Party's 1999 proposed Māori 
policy.34 Alongside acknowledgement of the Crown's Article Three responsibility for the 
protection of Māori citizenship rights sat references to "co-signatories" and "self-
determination" which implied that the Labour Party was serious about negotiating the current 
power-sharing arrangements by recognising Māori as an equal partner. "Self-determination", 
in particular, is a highly contestable term, but in the Aotearoa/New Zealand context it certainly 
has connotative meaning that in this case implies, if not intends, recognition of tino 
rangatiratanga.35 
 
In a 1999 policy manifesto, the Labour government was highly critical of the lack of 
responsiveness to Māori issues demonstrated by public sector departments and agencies, and 
made clear its expectations:  
Government is seeking increased assurance that departments are actively improving 
their capacity to develop Māori policy advice and implement effective service delivery 
mechanisms for Māori. There is an increased expectation that Chief Executives and 
their departments will address Māori issues. 
 
Māori and Neoliberalism 
When a Labour Government was elected in 1984, it began to see devolution to iwi as a 
central way forward on Māori issues. What became apparent over time was that Ministers 
and officials viewed Māori desire to run their own affairs as consistent with the introduction 
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of neoliberal policies, policies which would, over time, abandon the principles of the welfare 
state and replace them with those of capitalist individualism. Neoliberalism had a history in 
other nations which viewed indigenous peoples and cultures as obstacles to economic 
development, and a group to be eliminated, or at the very least, side-lined. In that context, 
neoliberalism had the potential to become a vehicle for the transmission of older colonial 
beliefs and values, but through more covert language and reasoning.36 The question therefore 
arose as to whether indigenous people would be permitted to exercise their sovereignty, or 
whether the government would introduce new rules, impediments, or challenges to make it 
difficult, if not impossible, for Māori to succeed.  
 
Some Māori were quick to voice their fears that deregulation and a laissez-faire approach 
would worsen their already poor socio-economic position, given their concentration in the 
types of employment which would suffer most from the new policies. Others, however, 
believed that if rangatiratanga was paid fundamental respect, then a decade down the track, 
welfare support to achieve parity with pākehā would no longer be needed.  
 
Unfortunately, the latter position prevailed. By the late 80s and early 90s the country was 
feeling the effects of extreme neoliberal policies. Between 1989 and 1990, the total number of 
Māori people receiving the unemployment benefit increased by 20 percent.37 At the same time 
there was a drive to cut the amount of revenue spent on government benefits. Jonathon Boston 
picks 1991 as the turning point in creating mass child poverty in New Zealand. He singles out 
one policy change, the 1991 budget cuts to benefit levels, as being the major cause of the one-
quarter of New Zealand’s children now living below the poverty line.38   
 
The 1987 General Election 
There is a rich repository of knowledge and insight into the increase of punitiveness over the 
last thirty years. John Pratt’s work on “the new punitiveness,” Garland’s reference to the 
“politics of exclusion,” and Robert Reiner’s description of punitiveness and inequality, all 
contribute to an understanding of the growth of punitiveness, and its relationship to 
neoliberalism.39  
 
New Zealand’s response to neoliberalism was more enthusiastic than almost any other, as was 
its preparedness to engage in policies of intolerance and punitiveness. By the 1987 General 
Election, the political rhetoric was downright scary, with the opposition emhasising threats to 
public safety, and the Labour Party mounting a “Rub out a Crim” campaign. John Pratt’s 2005 
paper “The Dark Side of Paradise” provides the most compelling explanation that I can find: 
he depicts New Zealand as an inherently punitive nation, one intolerant of non-conformists and 
ne’er do wells.40 If that description is accurate, then the neoliberal agenda fitted like a glove.  
 
The neoliberal agenda expanded over time, as did the political rhetoric and behaviour that 
accompanied it. These included reference to the dangerous underclass, the need to “right the 
balance” between prisoner’s rights and victim’s rights, policies which erected boundaries of 
exclusion between the law-abiding community and offenders, the exercise of control and 
surveillance not only within but beyond prison, an increased commitment to putting more 
people in prison for longer, and making it more difficult for them to leave. 
  
These policies and attitudes not only shaped future policy, but also impacted on the existing 
policy regime. The 1985 Criminal Justice Act had been overtaken by retributive public opinion 
and political rhetoric by the time it was passed, and was extensively amended in 1987, 1993, 
and 2002, to reflect hardening attitudes.   
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Mātua Whangai underwent a number of changes after 1985 and, by the late 1990s, it had moved 
away from the original intent of developing Māori-community centred approaches, to a limited 
service provision model that implemented departmental aims with programme contractors. 
These types of community crime prevention programmes incorporated features of Māori 
responses to social harm, but became state-controlled and designed initiatives with “added” 
Māori cultural elements to existing intervention logic.41 
 
Even Puao te Ata Tu failed to escape. As recommended by Puao te Ata Tu, and agreed to be 
the earlier Labour government, a Social Welfare Commission and District Executive 
Committees were set up in 1990, with Māori representation on each. A year later they were 
abolished by legislation. The official reasons were various, but the general view is that there 
was public sector resistance to having Māori involved in the policy formation process.  
 
The accepted view is that if Palmer’s Criminal Justice legislation had been introduced after 
1987 it would never have seen the light of day. That fate however, was reserved for Moana 
Jackson’s significant publication He Whaipānga Hou, commissioned in 1985 by the 
Department of Justice.42 
 
By the time He Whaipānga Hou was published in 1988, the die was cast. Jackson’s work 
involved three years of research among the wider Māori community, including police, 
correctional officers, policy workers, inmates, community workers, and academics. In his 
recent PhD thesis, Riki Mihaere comments that the report  
… advanced the view that a history of colonialist policies and practices have 
marginalised Māori people and that the disproportionate rate of offending and 
imprisonment is inextricably bound to the status of Māori at the margins of New 
Zealand society. Further, he argued that the high rates of Māori crime are related to 
the intersection of Māori, predominantly Māori men, acting in a negative way to the 
imposition of a mono-culturally myopic system of power and the subsequent 
detrimental reaction of the criminal justice system towards Māori…. In this context, 
the criminal justice system’s focus on the rehabilitation of Māori offenders and 
prisoners is negated by the reality that, for many Māori, the omnipresent effects of 
marginalisation that colonialism has brought to bear on generations of Māori 
communities have not provided an environment of good habilitation that can be 
returned to.43 
 
And further:  
In the third part to his report, Jackson identifies the institutional bias of systematic 
responses to Māori, such as race-based policing and discriminatory judicial sentencing 
trends, which in the view of his research participants increased the likelihood of entry 
into a perpetual cycle of negative contact with the criminal justice system. The 
consequences of this are manifest in an increase in Māori vulnerability towards 
crime.44 
 
The report was a stunning analysis of the interaction of Māori with the criminal justice system, 
its cultural bias and the imposition of inappropriate styles of working with offenders, victims 
and their communities. This body of knowledge was largely ignored by public servants, 
politicians and the press, who instead focussed on Jackson’s “considered alternative” for a 
parallel, autonomous Māori justice system. The government and media conveyed that view to 
the public in stark and simplistic terms, avoiding Jackson’s in-depth analysis.  Contrary to the 
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protocol of the time, the Minister of Justice did not provide a written introduction to it, and 
according to Charlotte Williams, there was ample anecdotal evidence that Palmer would have 
liked to prevent its publication.45 After 1992, the significance of this work was studiously 
ignored or sidestepped, both inside and outside government, as Williams comments, “almost 
as if it were on the Vatican’s index of prohibited reading for Catholics.”46  
 
During the 1990s, and despite government advancement in other parts of the public sector, the 
primary trend in the criminal justice sector shifted toward the controlled integration of Māori 
concepts and cultural practises into confined areas of the criminal justice system.47 Criminal 
Justice managers introduced “acceptable” elements of Māori culture into the state-dominated 
system and sought to enhance the goals and status of the formal system through recruitment of 
more Māori into the justice sector. Officials also strove to achieve the goals of the strategy 
through enhancing officials’ awareness of Māori culture.48 
 
The New Zealand Police, for example, actively recruited more Māori officers and developed 
cultural awareness programmes as part of its responsiveness policy. In the view of social 
commentators of the times,  
broader issues outside the normal institutional discourse – such as entitlement of the 
tangata whenua (people of the land), closure of the socio-economic gap, 
empowerment of tribal authorities and enhancement of Māori language and culture – 
received little attention.49 
 
As Tauri and Webb describe it, the responsiveness strategies developed through the 1990s 
became the conduit for the integration of acceptable elements of Māori culture into the state 
dominated system, but failed to address the structural organisation or the power relations 
between the State and Māori.50  
 
The Corrections Bi-Cultural Therapy Model, introduced in 1998, aimed to deliver 
psychological treatments to Māori offenders through grafting elements of tikanga into western 
therapeutic models of intervention.51 It was an approach which caused a great deal of dissension 
and distress amongst Māori, and was the subject of a Treaty claim in 2004.52 
 
The state’s treatment of He Whaipaanga Hou achieved two things. First, the public repudiation 
of a parallel but complementary approach to Māori justice diverted attention away from 
Jackson’s comprehensive analysis of the genesis of Māori offending. Second, it led to the 
government taking a different route, which found refuge within the government’s 
Responsiveness to Māori Framework. The Responsiveness Framework became a means of 
moderating and managing Māori aspirations for autonomy and rangatiratanga within the 
criminal justice system.  
 
In short, the 1980s was a time of big reviews and of landmark legislation. The list of reviews 
is impressive, but the quality of their output varied. Almost all of these committees and 
inquiries came up with recommendations relating to offending by Māori, and almost all of them 
were either ignored or implemented badly.53  
 
Addressing Issues of Structural Discrimination  
That did not mean, however, that the concerns identified by Jackson around institutional bias, 
race-based policing and discriminatory judicial sentencing trends were shelved.  Thirteen 
reports were written between 1998 and 2009, including reports from government agencies, 
which provided clear evidence of systemic bias against Māori.54 From 2009 onwards, however, 
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government agencies stopped addressing the issue, and actively discouraged external 
researchers from undertaking this research. Government approaches to the issue of racism 
changed from 2009, and is today characterised by Ministerial denial of the existence of racism 
within the criminal justice system.  
 
From 2005 onwards, successive governments developed a stock response to recommendations 
from a range of United Nations Committees, requesting that the government urgently 
investigate the issue of Māori over-representation in the criminal justice system, and the 
existence of racial discrimination. The government highlighted programmes and achievements 
which purportedly demonstrated high levels of cultural responsiveness, and then completely 
avoided UN recommendations directed at addressing issues of structural discrimination and 
personal racism.55 The 2015 recommendation from the UN Committee on Arbitrary Detention, 
is typical of earlier ones: 
105 (e) The Government should intensify its efforts to tackle the root causes of 
discrimination against Māori and Pacific Islanders in the criminal justice system, and 
particularly to reduce the high rates of incarceration among Māori, especially Māori 
women.56 
 
The UN Committee on Human Rights, which monitors state party compliance with the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), examined New Zealand's 
performance during its 116th session from 7 to 31 March 2016 in Geneva. The advance 
unedited edition of the Committee's Concluding Observations (CCPR/C/NZL/CO/6) followed 
the pattern of similar UN reports over the last decade by first acknowledging the government’s 
programmes and initiatives, but moving on to remind the government that these initiatives did 
not address the underlying issue of Māori over-representation in the criminal justice system.57  
At its 3259th meeting, held on 24 March 2016, it adopted the following concluding 
observations: 
 
Non-discrimination in Law-Enforcement 
23. The Committee notes the information provided regarding the outcomes of the 
investigations related to the so-called Operation Eight (anti-terrorism raids carried out 
on 14 October 2007), as well as the efforts made to incorporate some of the 
recommendations by the Independent Police Conduct Authority (IPCA) in the police 
operational planning and operational guidelines. It also notes statements by State 
officials suggesting an 
“unconscious bias” in police operations towards Māori and is concerned about 
allegations of racial profiling involving Māori and persons of African descent (arts. 2, 
7, 14, 26, and 27). 
 
24. The State party should undertake comprehensive review of law enforcement 
operational policies in order to ensure their conformity with human rights principles, 
including the prohibition of discrimination, and to evaluate their impact on indigenous 
peoples. The State party should also provide training to law-enforcement officials in 
order to sensitize them to the need to conduct themselves in a way that does not lead, 
even unintentionally, to acts of racial profiling. 
 
25. While noting the efforts made by the State party to address the issue of 
overrepresentation of Māori and Pasifika in the criminal justice system, with particular 
focus on youth, including through the initiative “Turning of the Tide: A Whānau Ora 
Crime and Crash Prevention Strategy” and the Youth Crime Action Plan, the 
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Committee remains concerned about the disproportionately high rates of incarceration 
and over-representation of Māori and Pasifika, and particularly women and youth, at 
all levels of criminal justice process (arts. 2, 14, 24, 26). 
 
26. Recalling its previous concluding observations (CCPR/C/NZL/CO/5, para. 12), 
the Committee urges the State party to:  
(a) Review its law-enforcement policies with a view to reducing incarceration 
rates and over-representation of members of Māori and Pasifika communities, 
particularly women and youth, at all levels of the criminal justice system, as 
well as reconviction and re-imprisonment rates;  
 
(b) Eliminate direct and indirect discrimination against Māori and Pasifika in 
the administration of justice, including through human rights training 
programmes for law enforcement, the judiciary and penitentiary personnel.  
 
A Socially Constructed Silence 
One of the most frustrating and indeed traumatising experience in life is to want desperately to 
have a conversation about a compelling and disturbing trend, only to find that that there is no 
one prepared to talk. On the issue of racism and structural discrimination, there exists a socially 
constructed silence. In a different era, in a different place, from a different perspective, the need 
to debate would be huge and obvious; the 1981 Springbok Tour comes to mind. In 2015, 
institutional racism in the criminal justice system was big in Ferguson, Missouri; in New 
Zealand, in contrast, we live within the confines of a socially constructed silence, and the few 
voices that are raised against it are so marginalised as to present no moral challenge.  
 
A Changing Role for Cultural Responsiveness Strategies 
Within this contemporary context, departmental Responsiveness to Māori Strategies are being 
used to fill three purposes for which they were not originally intended. First, they have been 
used as window dressing; as a subterfuge to convince external observer’s that the government 
agency is fully committed to a Crown-Māori partnership. Second, within the criminal justice 
sector, they serve to avoid addressing the root causes of discrimination, and indeed of crime, 
against Māori and Pacific peoples. Third, they are used as a tool to manage, control and 
suppress the full expression of rangatiratanga.  
 
Where is Rangatiratanga Now? 
Has the state finally contained the energies of rangatiratanga and appropriated them for its own 
purposes, as it has attempted to do so many times since early colonisation? Compare the 
government’s approach of 1986 to Pu Ao Te Atatu as described earlier, with the very recent 
Review of CYF. The 2015 CYF review contains no reference to Government / Māori 
partnership or the Treaty of Waitangi. Nor was there any significant consultation with Māori. 
As Richard Hill comments, “for Māori to gain Crown recognition of te tino rangatiratanga, 
decision makers on both sides will need to explore ways of genuinely meeting indigenous 
aspirations.”58  
 
He quotes the view of Webster, who in 1979 noted that: 
If the Pākehā majority does not understand the implications of the Māori search for 
identity and if it reacts with hostility to the growth of Māori nationalism and remains 
blind to the growing necessary for cultural pluralism, then with the rise of Māori 
consciousness there will be a realisation of the limits of passivity. More militant 
doctrines will take hold.59 
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What Might Rangatiratanga Look Like?  
I want to close by making two observations. First, and as earlier mentioned, Hill favoured the 
term “autonomy” as a useful interpretation of rangatiratanga, preferring it to the earlier concept 
of “chieftainship.” Public servants and politicians will have their own vision of what that 
entails.  
 
Earlier this year I was part of a group which evaluated an innovative Māori managed 
programme called Wakamoemoeā. Run by a small Māori Trust, and funded by Te Puni Kokiri, 
it had operated in three “hard to reach” Māori gang communities, with  former gang leaders 
playing a key role in a social mobilisation strategy, aimed at reducing violence, increasing 
social functioning; and improving community safety. After three years of operation, the results 
were stunning. There had been increases in full time employment, adult education, reductions 
in crime and family violence, children were staying at school for longer and there were changes 
in attitudes toward the female gender. This was clearly an exercise in rangatiratanga; 
marginalised Māori communities being quietly supported to take responsibility for bringing 
about social change. As the late Mongrel Mob leader Roy Dunn once said, “We don’t want a 
hand out, we don’t want a hand up – we just want a hand.”60 
 
I was not totally convinced, until one day, shopping at Countdown, I encountered a male gang 
member who had been involved in the project, with his 10 year old mokopuna, wheeling a 
shopping trolley. This was a minor miracle. Male gang members don’t shop – the women do 
the shopping. I couldn’t resist it, and said to him, “Manu, you’re shopping!” He looked a little 
sheepish and responded, “Oh, Matua, don’t you know? Anything women can do, men can do 
better.” I prodded him a little further. “But you’re at Countdown. Your whānau usually shop at 
Pak‘n’Save!” He produced his I-phone, tapped an app, and showed me. “Yeh, but I’ve got this 
Countdown app, and it tells me when there’s a bargain. After that, I go back to Pak‘n’Save.” 
At the moment, the store supervisor came up to us, and said to me, “Is everything all right, 
Sir”” Manu looked at me, his eyes rolling upward, that “here we go again” look. I couldn’t help 
myself, and replied, “No it’s not. My mate has this Countdown app, and he won’t tell me where 
all the bargains are!” At that, we both cracked up, and the supervisor swiftly departed, trying 
to make sense of it all. 
 
There was one feature of the evaluation however, that was less than satisfactory. The key social 
agencies that were aware of the programme, and were expected to participate fully in it, 
distanced themselves both from the programme, and the evaluation. The decision not to engage 
was interpreted by the community as avoiding the possibility that they might be asked to 
endorse the efforts of a group that has had been repeatedly labelled as criminal. The non-
engagement of the State suggests that these “hard to reach” communities would continue to 
remain both isolated and marginalised.  But it is an indication of what could be achieved, by 
the deliberate transfer of rangatiratanga to those people most affected, and empower them to 
make the changes themselves.  
 
Closing Observation  
My closing observation is of a more personal nature. Today I tracked one thread of thought 
over a thirty year period, commenting earlier that there are so many different threads that only 
make complete sense when they come together.  
 
As I wrote this paper, I kept being drawn back to the words spoken by the first Māori King, 
Pōtatau Te Wherowhero,  
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Kotahi ano te kohao o te ngira  
E kuhuna ai te miro ma te miro whero me te miro pango  
A muri i a au kia mau ki te ture ki te whakapono ki te aroha 
Hei aha te aha! hei aha te aha! 
“There is but one eye of the needle, 
Through which the white, red and black threads must pass. 
Hold fast to the law, hold fast to faith, hold fast to love 
Forsake all else!”61 
 
Te Wherowhero was speaking of the importance of unity, and holding fast to key ideals and 
principles.  Early one morning I awoke, and realised what the problem was. We have lost the 
needle – there is nothing for us to thread those ideas through. The needle is lying lost 
somewhere in the haystack of neoliberalism, of market solutions, of competition, of 
performance measurement, of materialism.  
 
Imagine if we had a needle called justice, through which passed only those threads that 
contributed to that one ideal.  If we can discover (or re-discover) that needle, we can once more 
be unashamed of our reputation as a nation that pursues the ideal of justice; we can talk with 
pride about our human rights record, our legislative performance, and an overriding concern 
for the “least, the lost and the lonely.”62 It is a public conversation waiting to be had.  
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